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Abstract—One of the main challenges in integrating Cyber-
Physical System-of-Systems (CPSoS) to function as a single
integrated system is the autonomy of its CPSs, which may lead
conflicts among them due to lack of coordination. We advocate
that to efficiently integrate CPSs within the overall context of
the CPSoS, we need to adjust the autonomy of some CPSs in
a way that enables them to coordinate their activities to avoid
any conflict among one another. To achieve that, we need to
incorporate the notion of governance within the CPSoS design,
which defines rules that can be used for clearly specifying who
and how can adjust the autonomy of a CPS. In this paper, we
try to tackle this problem by proposing a new conceptual model
that can be used for performing a governance-based analysis of
autonomy for CPSs within CPSoS. We illustrate the utility of the
model with an example from the automotive domain concerning
a cooperative driver overtaking assistance system.
Index Terms—Autonomy, Governance, Cyber-Physical Systems
of Systems, CPSoS, SoS, Conceptual Modeling
I. INTRODUCTION
A Systems of Systems (SoS) is an integration of a finite
number of systems that are independent and operable, which
are networked together to achieve a higher goal [1]. While
a Cyber-Physical System-of-Systems (CPSoS) is an SoS but
its component systems are Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs),
where a CPS is a system consisting of cyber components,
controlled components and possibly of interacting humans [2].
Assuring that a CPSoS/SoS can function as a single inte-
grated system to support a common mission is a main goal for
the CPSoS/SoS community [1], [2]. However, such integration
is not an easy task due to the unique and special nature that
distinguishes CPSoS/SoS from other types of systems, and
especially the autonomy of its components (e.g., CPSs) [2].
More specifically, the autonomy of CPSs may lead to conflicts
and unsafe situations due to the lack of coordination among
CPSs. For instance, a self-driving car that was in autonomous
driving mode has hit and killed a woman that was walking
outside of the crosswalk recently [3]. This is an example where
the autonomy of CPSs led to a lack of coordination among
CPSs that, in turn, have led to a disaster.
In a previous work [4], we argued that coordination among
CPSs can be achieved by adjusting the autonomy level of some
CPSs within the overall CPSoS in a way that enables them
to safely perform their own activities without endangering
any other CPS that is operating in the same environment.
Although several researchers have suggested adjusting the
autonomy level of a system based on various aspects such as
its capability, motivations, behavior, etc. [5], [6]. We proposed
criteria for determining the autonomy level of a CPS based on
their Awareness concerning their operational environment as
well as their capability to safely perform their activity (e.g.,
Controllability) [4]. Based on these criteria, a CPS can have
full, partial or limited autonomy for performing a specific
activity.
However, we did not provide governance rules/policies that
specify who and how can adjust the autonomy of CPSs. In
other words, component systems (e.g., CPSs) maintain an
ability to operate autonomously, but their operational mode
is subordinated to a central managed purpose [7], [8]. Such
central managed purpose can be expressed by governance
rules/policies. Governance can be defined as the set of rules,
policies, and decision-making criteria that will guide the
CPSoS/SoS while achieving its goals [7]. Governance is not
a new concept, it is an emerging paradigm in Systems Theory
[9], and it represents a cornerstone of an effective CPSoS/SoS
[7]. Despite this, it did not receive enough attention from the
CPSoS/SoS community [7], [9].
To this end, we advocate that in order to efficiently integrate
CPSs within the overall context of their CPSoS, we need to
incorporate the notion of governance within the CPSoS design.
In this paper, we try to tackle this problem by proposing a new
conceptual model that can be used for providing a governance-
based autonomy analysis for CPSs within CPSoS. In other
words, the model can be used for analyzing the autonomy level
of CPSs taking into consideration governance rules defined by
the CPSoS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; Section
II describes a motivating example we use to illustrate our
work. We propose a conceptual model that can be used for
providing a governance-based analysis of autonomy for CPSoS
in Section III, and we illustrate its applicability to a realistic
scenario from the automotive domain in Section IV. Related
work is presented in Section V. Finally, we conclude and
discuss future work in Section VI.
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II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE: COOPERATIVE DRIVER
OVERTAKING ASSISTANCE SYSTEM
Overtaking on undivided roads is one of the most complex
driving tasks, where a driver may make several decisions based
on the traffic conditions [10], i.e., a driver needs to identify an
acceptable size gap in the opposing traffic, the time at which
he initiates the overtake as well as the time at which to return
to its lane in front of the preceding vehicle [11]. In particular,
overtaking is one of the major traffic safety problems, that is
why there is much work towards developing driving support
systems that reduce overtake-related accidents [10]–[12].
The cooperative driver overtaking assistance system aims
at supporting drivers to avoid overtake-related accidents on
undivided roads, where Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
(ADAS), Road Side Units (RSUs), vehicles, and other road
infrastructure cooperate to reduce overtake-related accidents.
In particular, RSUs collect and disseminate information that as-
sists drivers/ADAS to avoid overtake-related accidents. While
ADAS aims at improving the driver’s safety by a thorough task
analysis of overtaking activity considering the driver’s ability
to complete a safe overtake. The ADAS can monitor, warn
and even take control of the vehicle in case the driver is not
able to perform/complete a safe overtake.
Information can be exchanged (sent and received) between
the system components either directly relying on dedicated
channels (e.g., wired or wireless channels), or indirectly rely-
ing on acquiring such information by sensing the domain. For
example, RSUs/drivers can acquire information about close-by
vehicles by sensing/seeing [13].
The main components of the system are shown in Fig. 1, and
we can also identify the four Steps in a successful overtake:
S1. the driver estimates the possibility of safely overtaking
a preceding vehicle, S2. the driver initiates the overtaking,
S3. the driver passes the preceding vehicle in the opposite
lane, and S4. changing the lane back into the original lane
of the vehicle, which completes the overtaking successfully.
Considering these steps, a vehicle can be in 1- safe area, it is
safe from overtaking-related hazard; 2- warning area, it can be
in danger due to an overtake in process; and 3- danger area,
it is in imminent danger from an overtake in process.
III. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR GOVERNANCE-BASED
ANALYSIS OF AUTONOMY IN CYBER-PHYSICAL
SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS
A conceptual model should include main constructs that
represent the key concepts of the domain along with the
relationships among them. To this end, the proposed concep-
tual model contains the required concepts and relationships
that allows for performing a governance-based analysis of
autonomy levels for CPSs within CPSoS.
The meta-model of the proposed conceptual model is de-
picted in Figure 2. In which, we can identify a CPSoS that in-
tegrates CPSs. For instance, the cooperative driver overtaking
assistance system is a CPSoS that integrates several CPSs such
as RSUs, ADAS, drivers, etc. A CPS can perform activities
for achieving its own objectives and/or the objectives of the
overall CPSoS. For example, a driver may perform an overtake
(an activity) to pass a slower vehicle. Usually, an activity is
performed in an operational environment (we call Sphere of
Action (SoA) [13]), which is a part of the domain. For instance,
an overtake (activity) can be performed in specific part of
an undivided rural roads (SoA). A SoA can be described by
information. For example, an RSU can acquire information
describing the situation of the traffic concerning some part
of an undivided rural road. CPSs can rely on one another
for information, i.e., a CPS can provide/receive information
depending on the information provision concept. For instance,
a driver can depend on a RSU to provide him with information
concerning the road situation.
A CPS must be aware of its SoA to operate in it, and the
awareness of relationship between a CPS and a SoA is used to
capture such relation. Following [5], we differentiate between
1- aware by self, when a CPS has the self-capability to be
aware of its SoA, e.g., CPS is independent, and 2- aware by
dependency, when a CPS needs to depend on other CPS to
be aware of its SoA, e.g., CPS is dependent. For instance, a
driver is aware by self of the road situation, if he has the
self-capability for acquiring information describing the road
situation. While a driver is aware by dependency of the road
situation, if he depends on an RSU to provide him with such
information.
The controllability of a CPS over the performance of an
activity it aims to perform is captured relying on the control-
lability relationship, which is characterized by one attribute,
namely controllability level that can be: 1- Controllable, a CPS
is able to detect and avoid any obstacle that might prevent
it from safely performing its activity in a timely manner;
2- Uncontrollable, a CPS is not able to detect and/or avoid
all obstacles that might prevent it from safely performing
its activity in a timely manner. For example, performing
an overtake during daylight where there are no obstacles
limiting/preventing the driver’s visibility is controllable by the
driver since he has the capability to detect another vehicle and
avoid colliding with it in a timely manner. While performing
an overtake with no support of RSUs when the driver visibility
is limited might be uncontrollable.
To capture the autonomy level of a CPS concerning the
performance of an activity, we extend the perform relationship
between the CPS and Activity concepts with the autonomy
level attribute that can be, 1- Full autonomy, if the CPS
is aware by self of the environment, and the activity is
controllable with respect to the CPS capability, 2- Partial
autonomy, if it is aware by dependency and the activity is
controllable by it, and 3- Limited autonomy, if the activity is
uncontrollable regardless if it is aware by self/dependency of
the environment.
In what follows, we describe the concepts, relationships and
attributes that can be used for modeling governance within
CPSoS. A CPSoS can set Governance rules, which can be
defined as a set of rules, policies, and decision-making criteria
that will guide the CPSs while achieving their goals [7]. For
example, adjusting the autonomy of the driver (a CPS) from
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Fig. 1. A diagram of the cooperative overtaking assistance system with the critical zones
Full autonomy to Partial or Limited autonomy based on his
type of awareness of the SoA and his controllability level
concerning the activity can be specified within the Gover-
nance rules specified by the Cooperative Driver Overtaking
Assistance System (a CPSoS).
Governance rules can specify the power a CPS may possess,
where power can be defined as the capacity or ability to
direct or influence the behavior of others [14], [15], i. e., the
power of a CPS within the CPSoS is the maximum potential
ability of a CPS to influence the behavior of other CPS
concerning some performed activity. Following [14], we adopt
five bases/sources of power: 1- Reward power is defined as
power whose basis is the ability to reward; 2- Coercive power
is defined as power whose basis is the ability to punish; 3-
Legitimate power is defined as power whose basis is a formal
authority that an individual has, which allows it to influence
another individual(s), who has/have an obligation to accept
such influence; 4- ReFerent power is defined as power whose
basis is trust, respect, and admiration between individuals; and
5- Expert power is defined as power whose basis is knowledge
and experience that an individual attributes to another one
within a specific area.
Power determines the authority a CPS may has over another
CPS concerning the performance of some activities, where
authority can be defined as the right to give orders, make de-
cisions, and enforce obedience [15]. For instance, the ADAS (a
CPS) can possess an Expert/Legitimate power over the driver
(another CPS). This power gives the ADAS the authority over
the driver performance concerning the overtake activity.
We differentiate between three types of authorities1: 1-
Monitoring is the process of observing and analyzing the
behavior of an individual in order to detect any undesirable
behavior; 2- Warning is the process of informing an indi-
vidual, usually in advance, of possible danger, problem, or
other unpleasant situation; and 3- Controling is the process
of influencing, directing or even determining the behavior
1These types are not mutually exclusive, i.e., a CPS may have all three
types of authorities over another CPS
of an individual. Several researchers (e.g., [14], [16], [17])
have concluded that various sources of power have different
influence over the individuals’ behavior, which is out of the
scope of this paper. In this work, we consider Expert and
Legitimate power, where the first grants only Monitoring
and Warning authorities, while the last grants Monitoring,
Warning as well as Controling authorities.
For example, when the ADAS have the Expert power, it
can be in the passive overtaking assistant mode, i.e., it has the
monitoring and warning authorities over the driver when the
driver has a partial autonomy to perform an overtake. While
when the ADAS have Legitimate power, it can be in the active
overtaking assistant mode, i.e., it has the monitoring, warning
and also controlling authorities over the driver when the driver
has a limited autonomy to perform an overtake.
IV. ILLUSTRATING THE UTILITY OF THE CONCEPTUAL
MODEL
We illustrate the utility of the conceptual model by applying
it to a realistic scenario concerning the Cooperative Driver
Overtaking Assistance System. Consider for example a driver
that aims at reaching his/her destination safely using an
undivided (two-lanes) road. Depending on the situation of
the traffic, the driver may perform several overtakes before
reaching his destination. Most overtakes on undivided roads
can be broadly classified under three different types:
1) Safe overtaking in clear visual conditions, the driver has
sufficient visibility for maintaining safe separation from
other vehicles/obstacles while performing the overtake,
i.e., the driver can self-detect (aware by self ) and avoid
any vehicle/obstacle while performing the overtake (the
overtake is controllable).
2) Safe overtaking in unclear visual conditions, the driver
may not has the self-capability to detect other vehicles
while performing his overtake. This could be due to
the nature of the road (e.g., a sharp curve) or due to
weather conditions (e.g., fog, heavy rain, etc.). In such




































































Fig. 2. The meta-model of the proposed conceptual model
with such information (i.e., aware by dependency). How-
ever, with such information, the overtake is considered
controllable by the driver.
3) Unsafe overtaking in critical conditions, the driver is
considered incapable of performing a safe overtake
regardless of his type of awareness of the SoA (e.g.,
aware by self or aware by dependency). Note that the
cooperative driver overtaking assistance system identi-
fies such overtakes by analyzing the location, speed and
direction of other vehicles in the maneuver area, i.e., the
system can estimate whether an overtake is controllable
or uncontrollable by the driver.
Taking the previous three types of overtaking, the coop-
erative driver overtaking assistance system and to increase
drivers’ safety by reducing overtake-related accidents can set
Governance rules for specifying the autonomy allowed to
drivers based on their type of awareness of the SoA and their
controllability levels concerning the overtakes. Such rules can
be interpreted into power that determines authorities over the
driver’s performance concerning the overtake activity.
For the first type of overtaking, the driver can have Full
autonomy concerning any overtake he wishes to perform,
i.e., the ADAS system is not granted any power/authority
over the driver and it provides no assistance at all. In the
second type of overtaking, the driver can have Patial autonomy
concerning any overtake he wishes to perform. The ADAS
system is granted an Expert power over the driver, which
allows it to be in the passive assistance mode, i.e., it has
the authority to monitor the driver’s behavior and warn him
about any possible dangerous situation. While in the last
type of overtaking, the driver can have Limited autonomy
concerning any overtake he wishes to perform. The ADAS
system is granted a Legitimate power over the driver, which
allows it to be in the active assistance mode, i.e., it has the
authority not only to monitor and warn the driver but also to
interrupt and control the overtake (e.g., reduces speed, applies
breaks, prevents initiating the overtake, prevents changing the
lane). Fig. 3 shows an abstract flow chart of a governance-
based analysis of the driver’s autonomy concerning the three
different types of overtaking.
Due to space limitation, we only describe the task analysis
concerning the driver’s autonomy in unsafe overtaking in
critical conditions that is shown in Fig. 4. As previously
mentioned, a successful overtake in undivided roads consists
of four main Steps.
In S1, the driver first decides there is a need for overtak-
ing, which depends on the speed of the preceding vehicle,
his/her desired speed, etc. After deciding there is a need for
overtaking, the driver waits an acceptable gap in the opposing
traffic that allows him/her to initiate the overtake. However,
even if the driver believes that there is an acceptable gap in
the opposing traffic, the ADAS may have another opinion as
drivers might have poor judgment concerning the distance and
speed of opposing vehicles, or they might not even see such
vehicles until they initiate the overtake. In other words, the
ADAS have better judgment than the driver, therefore, if the
ADAS decides that the gap is not appropriate, it will warn the
driver about that. If the driver did not comply with the warning,
the ADAS will prevent him/her from initiating such overtake.
In particular, the driver is allowed to initiate the overtake only
if the ADAS allows that.
In S2, the driver starts accelerating and steering aiming at
changing lanes, if the ADAS detects any obstacle/vehicle in the
opposing lane that may prevent the driver from safely changing
lanes, it warns the driver, stops acceleration and prevents the
driver from changing lanes if it has to, i.e., the ADAS halts
the overtake and the driver stays behind the preceding vehicle.
Otherwise, the driver is allowed to change lanes. The driver
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Fig. 3. An abstract flow chart of a governance-based analysis of the driver’s autonomy
the ADAS decided that the driver cannot safely complete the
overtake, it halts the overtake and the vehicle returns behind
the preceding vehicle.
After passing the preceding vehicle, S3 completes and S4
starts. In which, the driver maintains his/her speed trying to
find an acceptable space to return to its original lane in front
of the preceding vehicle(s). However, the driver is allowed to
do that only if the ADAS decides that the available gap is
adequate for completing the overtake. Otherwise, the ADAS
warns the driver that the space is not sufficient/adequate, and
if the driver tries to change lanes, the ADAS will prevent that.
In such case, the driver can maintain his/her speed and stay at
the opposing lane waiting for adequate space/gap if there is no
vehicle in the opposing direction. While if there is a vehicle,
the ADAS will halt the overtake and the vehicle will return
behind the preceding vehicle.
V. RELATED WORK
As previously mentioned, governance did not receive
enough attention from the CPSoS/SoS community [7], [9].
Despite this, several researchers have devoted effort toward
researching governance for CPSoS/SoS. For instance, Morris
et al. [8] survey the available literature concerning information
technology (IT) governance and identify six key characteristics
of good IT governance that can be used for SoS. Moreover,
Vaneman and Jaskot [7] worked toward developing a criteria-
based framework for SoS governance by conducting a survey
of governance practices within the IT community with the
main aim of identifying elements of good SoS governance.
Keating [9] explores the implications of Complex System
Governance (CSG) trying to find suggestions or even solutions
for similar governance challenges faced in the development of
the System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) area. Based on [9],
Keating and Bradley [18] presented a preliminary reference
model suitable for the emerging field of CSG.
Unlike existing solutions, we propose to link the governance
concept to the concepts of power and authority when adjusting
the level of autonomy of some CPS within the CPSoS.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we advocate that to efficiently integrate CPSs
within the overall context of their CPSoS, we need to adjust
the autonomy of some CPSs. To achieve that, we incorporated
the notion of governance within the CPSoS design, which
defines rules for clearly specifying who and how can adjust
the autonomy of a CPS. Moreover, we proposed a conceptual
model that can be used for performing a governance-based
analysis of autonomy for CPSs within CPSoS. Additionally,
we illustrated the utility and applicability of our model by
applying it to a realistic example from the automotive domain.
For future work, we intend to further investigate other
aspects that might influence the autonomy levels of CPSs. We
will also refine the proposed concepts aiming at performing
more expressive analysis. Finally, we will extend our model-
based approach presented in [4] with the new concepts and
relationships proposed in this paper.
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